ARTICLE PRESENTS and illustrates the use of a standard simple economic framework for the evaluation of policies on population and reproductive health services and contrasts this framework with current discussions of several issues in these fields. There is a long tradition of economic analysis in the population and reproductive health fields. Nevertheless, a number of current policy discussions could benefit from some realignment to become more consistent with the broader field of human resource policy analysis.
THIS ARTICLE PRESENTS and illustrates the use of a standard simple economic framework for the evaluation of policies on population and reproductive health services and contrasts this framework with current discussions of several issues in these fields. There is a long tradition of economic analysis in the population and reproductive health fields. Nevertheless, a number of current policy discussions could benefit from some realignment to become more consistent with the broader field of human resource policy analysis.
We think that there are two gains from such a realignment. First, the use of the standard economic framework for policy analysis would facilitate communication between analysts and policymakers working in the population and reproductive health community and economists and policymakers not working in these fields who are unfamiliar with the way policy issues are conceptualized by population and reproductive health sector specialists. Improving this communication is important because of ongoing policy discussions related to the extent to which scarce public resources should be directed toward population and reproductive health versus a large number of competing claims. Such discussions are likely to take place increasingly with ministries of finance and planning in developing countries, with key staff of development banks, and with policy and program specialists in bilateral donor agencies. Absent a realignment of the kind advocated in this article (or at least the ability to adapt analyses to these audiences), such interactions run the risk of becoming increasingly frustrating. Researchers working in population and reproductive health will be more effective policy analysts, and policymakers using their work will be more effective advocates for policies promoting family planning and reproductive health services, if the standard economic framework is used more in the future. Second, even discussions among policymakers and analysts in the population and reproductive health community generate some confusion because similar terms are used in different ways and not always within a unified analytical framework. In our judgment the standard economic policy framework is a useful one with which to contemplate policy issues in population and reproductive health, and its use will increase clarity in some areas in which there now seems to be confusion.
The intended audience of this article is economists engaged in preparing policy analyses for the benefit of the population and reproductive health community. In addition, the article may be of interest to a broader audience of policy analysts and policymakers in population and reproductive health who are interested in how economists think about policy issues and the implications of such thinking for the programs that concern them. The article is not intended to convince noneconomists that a standard economic framework is superior to that of any other discipline in conceptualizing problems and formulating effective policies in the population and reproductive health field. We make no effort to compare alternative frameworks for analyzing policies. Instead, our objective is to clarify where some of the differences arise in the hope that this will lead to more effective communication across disciplines. Of course, with improved communication comes a high probability that policies will be more carefully conceived, implemented, and evaluated.
The first section of the article presents a simple standard economic framework for thinking about policy in the social sectors generally and in population and reproductive health specifically. The material in this section is not new, and many readers with prior training in economics will be familiar with its contents. The section pulls together material from many sources, however, and provides the conceptual framework for the rest of the article. The second section illustrates how the framework can be applied in practice, using case studies from Indonesia and Vietnam. We then apply the policy framework to several key population and reproductive health policy issues (viz., pricing of services and cost recovery; access and quality; the role of the private sector; targets, incentives, and unmet need; decentralization; sustainability; and evaluation) and identify where current analysis in the field appears to be inconsistent with the policy framework. Finally, we provide some tentative conclusions about the direction of economic policy in population and reproductive health and identify potentially fruitful directions for future analyses.
Economic framework for evaluating policies in population and reproductive health
Often analyses of social-sector policies are undertaken without consideration of the general rationale for policies. It is presumed that policies that, say, increase access to family planning or education or improve health and nutrition must be good. But such analyses are of little help in convincing skeptics that scarce resources should be allocated for these purposes, given the many competing uses to which they can be put. Moreover, they may not provide much in the way of guidelines for choosing among policy alternatives in the population and reproductive health fields. It is useful to begin by asking why policy interventions in these areas (and in other areas of human resource development) might be desirable. For most economists the two possible justifications for governmental policy interventions in these and other areas are: 1) to increase efficiency and productivity; and 2) to redistribute resources.
Efficiency and productivity
Resources are used efficiently in the economic sense of the term if they are used to obtain the most product possible given the quantities of the resources and the available production technologies and if the composition of that product increases the welfare of members of society as much as possible given the resource and technological constraints and the distribution of resource ownership. An investment (or expenditure) in population and reproductive health services is efficient if the additional (marginal) social benefits of the last unit of that investment just equal its additional (marginal) social cost.
1 If the social marginal benefit of a particular investment is greater (less) than the social marginal cost, society is not investing enough (is investing too much) and would benefit from increasing (decreasing) the level of investment until the social benefits and costs become equal on the margin.
Although applying the above rule maximizes social gains, private maximizing behavior leads to population and reproductive health investments at the level at which the private marginal benefit of the investment equals its private marginal cost under the assumption that, given the information available to them and the constraints that they face, individuals act in what they perceive to be their best interests. Figure 1 provides an illustration for one individual. The private marginal benefit curve depends on the expected private gains as perceived by consumers from investing in one type of reproductive health service. These may reflect a desire for improved health, but they are also likely to reflect such other factors as the time required to consume the service, convenience, social customs, and imperfect information. The private marginal benefit curve is downward-sloping because of diminishing returns to such investments (i.e., benefits do not increase proportionately with additional expenditure as a consequence, for example, of fixed genetic health endowments). The private marginal cost curve may be increasing if there are increasing opportunity costs to devoting additional time to such investments, but the analysis applies equally to cases in which they are constant. Private returns net of costs are maximized at level H*, where private marginal benefits are equal to private marginal costs. Now consider what happens if the private incentives for population and reproductive health investments differ from the social incentives for such investments, first with respect to the marginal benefits and then with respect to the marginal costs.
Let the dashed line in Figure 2 represent the social marginal benefits for population and reproductive health investments that are drawn to be greater than the private marginal benefits.
2 In this case the private incentives are to invest at level H*, which is less than the socially optimal (efficient) level of investment at level H**. Therefore there is an efficiency argument for policies to induce or to require private investments at level H** instead of level H*.
Why might social marginal benefits exceed private marginal benefits for population and reproductive health investments? Among the most frequent answers are:
1. Some health and nutrition interventions, in addition to their direct impact on the individual's productivity and welfare, may reduce suscepti- 3 This is particularly relevant in the case of investments in the prevention and treatment of infectious diseases, such as HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases.
2. Information on which private investment decisions are made may misrepresent the private rates of return to these investments because it is incomplete or incorrect.
4 This is an important consideration in the case of population and reproductive health investments because actual and potential consumers are often not well informed about the benefits and costs. 3. There may be social gains beyond the private gains to population and reproductive health investments if such investments are viewed by society as inherently valuable (e.g., to facilitate catching up with other rapidly growing economies) in addition to their effects on individual economic productivity and consumption.
4. The combination of uncertainty, risk aversion, and imperfect insurance markets may result in private incentives to underinvest in health from a social point of view because from a social point of view the risks are pooled. 5. In the case of fertility, governmental subsidies to health care, schooling, and other social services may reduce the private costs of having additional children, thereby reducing the private marginal benefits to parents of expenditure on family planning services.
6. Household decisionmakers may not duly consider the preferences of all household members in allocating household resources. For example, the preferences of women for fewer or more widely spaced children or for safer childbirth may not be taken into consideration by husbands.
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Now let the dashed line in Figure 3 represent the social marginal costs for population and reproductive health investments that are drawn to be less than the private marginal costs. 7 In this case the private incentives are to invest at level H*, which is less than the socially optimal (efficient) level of investment at level H***. Therefore there is an efficiency argument to consider the possibility for policies to induce or to require private investments at level H*** instead of at level H*.
Why might social marginal costs be less than private marginal costs for population and reproductive health investments? Among the most frequent answers are: 1. There may be capital market imperfections for investments in health (in part because human capital is not recognized as collateral) such that the private marginal costs for such investments exceed their true social marginal costs, probably more so for individuals from poorer families who cannot easily self-finance such investments. This may pose a problem, for example, for risky investments in such areas as safe motherhood (e.g., emergency obstetric services) that involve substantial outlays with some of the benefits reaped only after considerable delays under conditions in which capital and insurance markets do not function well or are nonexistent.
2. The sectors that provide population and reproductive health services may produce them inefficiently because institutional arrangements do not induce efficient production of an efficient basket of commodities. This is mainly a problem where services are provided directly (and often inefficiently) by governments, or are heavily regulated; but it can also be an outcome of monopoly pricing.
Distribution
Distribution is a major policy motive distinct from efficiency. Society well might want to ensure that everyone has basic social services even at some cost in reduced efficiency and productivity. Sometimes family planning, education, health, and nutrition services are viewed as "merit goods" that are socially desirable in themselves (e.g., the UNDP Human Development Reports take this approach).
Policy choices to increase efficiency and to improve distribution
Consider first efficiency. If all other markets in the economy are operating efficiently and there are differences between marginal private incentives and marginal social incentives in population and reproductive health service markets so that private incentives are to invest at level H* instead of at level H** in Figure 2 or level H*** in Figure 3 , policies that increase the human capital investment to the socially efficient levels increase efficiency and productivity. If all other markets in the economy are not operating efficiently, then policies that narrow the differences between private and social incentives in population and reproductive health service markets do not necessarily increase efficiency and productivity. It is conceivable that the distortion between private and social incentives in this market is simply offsetting some distortion elsewhere, so that the economy will become less efficient and less productive if this distortion by itself is lessened.
8 Because there always are distortions between private and social incentives elsewhere in the economy, this may seem to be bad news for establishing an efficiency/productivity basis for policy. But, in the absence of specific infor-mation to the contrary, such as the existence of two counterbalancing distortions, a reasonable presumption is that lessening any one distortion between social and private incentives is likely to increase efficiency and productivity.
The foregoing still does not indicate what policies would be best to induce population and reproductive health investments at level H** in Figure 2 or level H*** in Figure 3 . There is a large set of possibilities, including governmental fiats, governmental provision of social services such as schools and health clinics at heavily subsidized prices, price incentives in the markets for population and reproductive health services, price incentives in other markets, and changing institutional arrangements in various markets. To choose among alternatives, there are two important considerations.
First, it is necessary to realize that policies have costs. These costs are not only the direct costs of implementing and monitoring the policy, but also the distortionary costs introduced by policies that may encourage socially inefficient behavior (including rent-seeking 9 by both public and private entities).
10 In fact the costs may be sufficiently high that it is not desirable to try to offset some market failures by introducing policies.
11 But, if it is desirable to do so, there is a case for making policy changes that are directed as specifically as possible to the distortion of concern because that tends to lessen the distortion costs. An efficiency policy hierarchy can be defined in which alternative policies to attain the same improvement in efficiency in a particular market are ranked according to their social marginal costs, including direct and distortion costs. A policy is higher in the policy hierarchy if it has lower social marginal costs. This hierarchy indicates the preferential ordering of policies to deal with particular divergences between private and social incentives.
Second, there are far-reaching information problems regarding what effects policies have, particularly in a rapidly changing world. This is an argument in favor of policies that are as transparent as possible, which generally means higher in the policy hierarchy with regard at least to distortion costs because more direct policies are likely to be more transparent. This also is an argument for considering an experimental approach to evaluating policy alternatives-that is, rather than introducing a reform country-wide, for introducing variants of reforms for health clinics, schools, and other social services in randomly selected sites with careful monitoring of the results for both the experimental groups and the control groups. Information problems also provide an argument for price policies (taxes or subsidies) because shifts in the underlying relations are likely to be more visible to policymakers if they have an impact on the governmental budget than if they only change the distortions faced by private entities, as tends to happen with quantitative regulatory policies such as quotas and restrictions on production or use.
12 Finally information problems in the presence of heterogeneities across communities suggest the desirability of decentralization and empowerment of users of social services in order to increase the efficacy of the provision of those services, although such considerations must be balanced against possible economies of scale, higher quality of staff, and possibly lower levels of corruption at more centralized levels, as well as intercommunity distributional concerns.
Thus, for efficiency/productivity reasons, particularly given that information is imperfect and changes are frequent, there is an argument for choosing policies as high as possible in the policy hierarchy defined by the extent of marginal direct and distortionary costs-and thereby using interventions that are focused as directly on the problem as possible. 13 In particular, this means that if there is a good efficiency/productivity reason for public support for a population or reproductive health investment, the best way to provide such support is not necessarily through governmental provision of the services. Higher in the policy hierarchy than direct governmental provision of such services, for example, may be subsidies or taxes that create incentives for the efficient provision of these services whether the providers are public, private, or some mixture. On the other hand, policies that discriminate against one type of provider-for example, by making the availability of such subsidies dependent on the provider being public-are generally likely to be lower in the policy hierarchy than policies that do not have such conditions. Now consider distribution. Generally speaking the subsidization of specific goods and services (and even less, the direct provision by government of goods and services at subsidized prices) is not an efficient way of lessening distributional problems. Because subsidies are designed to lower prices to consumers, they induce inefficient consumption behavior (i.e., consumption at a point to the right of H* in Figure 1 ). Instead, it generally is more efficient (and thus has lower costs in terms of alternative resource uses) to redistribute income to consumers, allowing them to allocate the income in ways that lead to efficient patterns of consumption.
14 Of course, there are some cases in which subsidization of selected goods and services may be defensible to attain distributional objectives. For example, in cases where it is difficult (and therefore costly) to target the poor, subsidizing certain goods and services that are mainly consumed by the poor may be the most efficient policy alternative. A second example occurs when policymakers believe there is a serious problem of intrahousehold distribution (e.g., women and children are disadvantaged relative to adult males). In such circumstances, subsidies directed to goods and services consumed mainly by those who are viewed as disadvantaged within households may serve to improve their welfare more than cash payments directed to the household.
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Rather than being concerned with the command over resources of its poorer members, society, as noted above, may deem it desirable that everyone enjoy basic population, reproductive health, and other services.
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Such an objective might be obtained through many means. But presumably it is desirable to ensure that everyone has basic options for population and reproductive health care at as little cost as possible in terms of productivity. Therefore, rather than ignoring efficiency considerations, it is desirable to choose policies as high as possible in the efficiency policy hierarchy and still ensure that the basic objectives are met. Efficiency considerations thus play an important role in interaction with the pursuit of distributional goals.
Project evaluation
Cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis have been widely used to evaluate governmental investments, including investments related to population and reproductive health. 17 For example, cost-benefit analysis has been used extensively to evaluate family planning investments in developing countries since the 1960s, and variants of it are still being used.
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In the context of a market economy most economists presume that governmental intervention should be considered only if there are efficiency or distributional reasons for such policies and that particular policies should be adopted only if they are high in the policy hierarchy and have expected social marginal gains that exceed the social marginal costs (Folland, Goodman, and Stano 1993; Devarajan, Squire, and Suthiwart-Narueput 1997; Hammer 1997) . This paradigm invokes principles of welfare economics to evaluate the need for governmental intervention in markets, including those delivering population and reproductive health services (Preston 1986; Behrman 1993) . The application of cost-benefit analysis within this paradigm involves a redefinition of benefits to become the net social welfare gains (if any) resulting from governmental intervention in the form of either a project or a policy reform.
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Figure 4, which depicts the same situation as Figure 2 , illustrates this idea. If a subsidy is used to lower the private cost to consumers sufficiently that they increase their investment (e.g., use of contraceptives) from H* to H**, the net welfare gain from such a policy would be represented by the area formed by the triangle ABC. In a cost-benefit analysis, this net welfare gain would constitute the benefits, while the cost of administering the policy change (i.e., the cost of administering the subsidy as well as any distortionary costs) would constitute the policy's costs.
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Cost-effectiveness analysis has also been used widely to evaluate international population programs since at least the 1960s.
21 Cost-effectiveness analysis was originally developed as an alternative to cost-benefit analysis for evaluating competing investments in sectors such as national defense in which the output is not exchanged in markets and hence cannot be easily "valued." Cost-effectiveness analysis has also been used effectively as a managerial tool to evaluate alternative investments designed to achieve the same purpose. 22 However, it has also been used recently to evaluate dissimilar competing investments; 23 in the context of the present policy framework cost-effectiveness analysis used in this way has several limita-tions (Hammer and Berman 1995) . First, and perhaps most importantly, it fails to consider which services merit governmental interventions in the first instance.
24 Second, the benefits are too narrowly defined (e.g., improved health) as compared to the much broader concept of "welfare" that underlies the framework in this section. 25 Third, cost-effectiveness analysis completely neglects the demand side. If the reason for preparing cost-effectiveness analysis estimates is to determine which health services are worthy of public subsidization, price elasticities of demand effectively constrain the extent to which subsidies can increase levels of use (and therefore their ultimate potential to produce positive health effects).
Illustrations of the policy framework: Examples from Indonesia and Vietnam
In this section we illustrate the application of the policy framework presented above, using examples from two Asian countries. The first example, focusing on efficiency, is from the cost-benefit analysis of a recently devel- Knowles 1996 Knowles , 1997a . Benefits are estimated solely on the basis of the changes in economic welfare that result from the project's interventions (i.e., changes in consumer surplus, risk reduction). Although the example refers to safe motherhood, similar analysis can be done for other reproductive health or family planning investments. The second example, focusing on distribution, is drawn from a recent "benefit incidence" analysis of Vietnam's family planning program that estimates the share of governmental subsidies received by different income groups (Behrman and Knowles 1998a) .
Cost-benefit analysis of an Indonesian safe motherhood project
Although Indonesia has for many years registered impressive gains in family planning use, it lags behind other countries in the ASEAN region (as well as other middle-income developing countries) in maternal health. Indonesia's maternal mortality rate is estimated to be about 390 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births, and there is no evidence that it has declined much in recent years. The government of Indonesia committed itself as early as 1988 to reducing the maternal mortality rate by one-half by the year 2000. An accelerated midwife training program was initiated in 1993 to place a professionally trained midwife in every village of the country (World Bank 1997). By 1997, 55,000 village midwives had been trained and placed in villages (out of an estimated total of 60,000 villages nationwide).
Despite improved access, many Indonesian women fail to use the services of a trained midwife. 26 One explanation may be inadequate information within the population about the risks of their current consumption patterns (i.e., use of unqualified traditional birth attendants). Maternal mortality is a relatively rare event. At Indonesia's current maternal mortality and fertility rates, a village of average size (3,000 inhabitants) experiences a maternal death only once on average every five years. Even if villagers are careful observers, and include maternal morbidity and perinatal mortality outcomes as well as maternal mortality in evaluating their choices, they are hindered by the rarity of observations in making choices other than the traditional ones (i.e., births at home attended by traditional birth attendants). 27 The project addresses this information gap through a strong IEC (information, education, communication) component.
However, even well-trained village midwives are not able to care for all obstetric deliveries. Approximately 10 percent of women need to deliver in a hospital, either as a precautionary measure or in response to problems encountered during the delivery itself (emergency cases). Most rural Indonesian women do not have health insurance, so the high cost of hospital deliveries (particularly those requiring surgical intervention) is a barrier to many seeking the care they need. The project addresses this prob-lem by providing social insurance to pregnant women to cover the cost of emergency obstetric care.
The cost-benefit analysis of these two components of the project proceeds as follows:
The IEC component. The potential net social benefit resulting from the IEC component consists of the additional consumer surplus that results from shifting the current demand curve outward so that it is equal to the social marginal benefits curve corresponding to the demand of fully informed consumers (as in Figure 5 ). It is possible to obtain at least order-of-magnitude estimates of these benefits (triangle ABC in Figure 5 ) by making the following assumptions:
-The marginal cost of midwife obstetric delivery services is assumed to be constant. The main costs of professionally attended deliveries, most of which occur in the woman's home, are the midwife's time and a limited amount of consumable supplies. In the absence of this assumption, an estimate of the elasticity of supply would be required. Human resource investments -The full-information demand for professionally attended births can be approximated by current patterns of use by women with at least some secondary education.
-The price elasticity of demand for attended births is -0.3. Most estimates of the price elasticity of demand for ambulatory medical care, both internationally (Folland, Goodman, and Stano 1993; Phelps 1992) and among rural Indonesian adults (Gertler and Molyneaux 1997) , are in the range of 0.0 to -0.4 (use of an elasticity closer to zero increases the magnitude of the estimated benefits).
Under these assumptions, annual benefits at the end of the project are estimated to be approximately 889 rupiah (US$0.38) per capita (see Appendix for a detailed description of the estimation process). These estimated benefits should be compared to the cost of the project's IEC component, but not to the cost of the additional health services consumed (since these are matched by an equivalent welfare value, i.e., rectangle M 1 ACM 2 in Figure 5 ), to obtain a benefit-cost ratio.
Emergency obstetric care insurance. The social financing of emergency obstetric care improves consumer welfare by allowing consumers to pool the risk of a major health expenditure. The welfare gains from risk pooling (i.e., the benefits) are greatest for risks such as the cost of emergency obstetric services that are relatively rare but involve large costs. Offsetting these benefits are costs in the form of: 1) welfare losses through increased consumption of services resulting from the price changes to an insured individual (in the health economics literature these losses are referred to, somewhat misleadingly, as "moral hazard" 28 and are depicted in Figure 6 as the triangle CDE, i.e., the difference between the cost of the extra services consumed and the valuation consumers place on them); and 2) the administrative (or "loading") costs of the insurance (Phelps 1992: 289-291). The following assumptions are used to facilitate the estimation of these benefits and costs: -Ten percent of women are assumed to be at risk of needing hospitalization for complications related to pregnancy or delivery, 70 percent of whom require nonsurgical interventions (at an average cost of 345,000 rupiah per admission) with the remaining 30 percent requiring surgery (at an average cost of 805,000 rupiah per admission).
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-The insurance provided involves a 20 percent coinsurance rate (i.e., the insurer reimburses the hospital for only 80 percent of costs, with the insured paying the remaining 20 percent).
-The price elasticity of demand for emergency obstetric services is 0.1. Most international studies indicate that the demand for hospital services, especially emergency services, is less elastic than that for outpatient services and in the range of 0.0 to -0.2 (Phelps 1992; Folland, Goodman, and Stano 1993).
-The income elasticity of the marginal utility of income is -0.4 (i.e., a one percent increase in consumer income is associated with a 0.4 percent decline in the marginal utility of income).
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Under these assumptions the benefits of emergency obstetric care insurance are estimated to be $4.58 per insured pregnancy, while the costs are estimated to be $2.48 per insured pregnancy, i.e., the sum of moral hazard costs of $0.67 and loading costs of $1.81 (see Appendix). The estimated annual benefit-cost ratio is therefore ($4.58/$2.48) = 1.85.
Distributional analysis of Vietnam's family planning program
Although Vietnam has had a strong antinatalist population policy since 1963, only since 1993 has the government made substantial investments in family planning. The program recently has made available more contraceptive methods, has implemented a large IEC component, 31 and has developed an administrative structure with paid staff down to the commune level and with thousands of volunteers at the village level (Mai Ky 1994). The total fertility rate has fallen from about 6.4 births per woman in 1960- 
Human resource investments
Marginal costs 64 to about 3.3 in 1989 -93 (General Statistical Office 1991 . Current demographic objectives include limiting couples to one or two children, achieving replacement-level fertility by the year 2015, and achieving a stable population by the year 2050. The government regards the family planning program as one of its most important development programs.
Vietnam has an extensive, but poorly funded governmental health system. At the top of the system are a limited number of relatively wellfunded central governmental hospitals operated by the Ministry of Health, almost all of which are located in urban areas. These facilities are generally acknowledged to provide the best quality health care. Although their inpatient services are in principle available to the entire population, their extensive outpatient services are practically accessible only to urban and suburban populations, and, because of the relatively high fees they charge, are mainly used by upper-income groups and senior governmental officials. Provinces operate a system of provincial and district hospitals, with the former being considerably larger and providing a broader range of higher quality services than the latter. Provinces also operate polyclinics (health centers staffed by several doctors) in a few areas having poor access to district hospitals. The lowest level of the governmental health system (and in fact not formally a part of it) consists of commune health centers operated and financed almost entirely by communes. They are typically staffed by one doctor or assistant doctor and one or two nurses and/or midwives. The government's family planning program provides services through the existing health infrastructure, and in contrast to most other health services (including prenatal care, obstetric delivery care, induced abortion, and menstrual regulation) there is usually no charge for either family planning services or contraceptives. Table 1 provides estimates of the use of family planning services by per capita consumption quintile. 32 These estimates indicate that current contraceptive use is 66 percent among the poorest women, 75-78 percent among women in the next three quintiles, and 70 percent among women in the richest quintile. Surprisingly, no systematic variation is observed between quintiles in rates of modern contraceptive use, which is 57 percent among the poorest women and 55 percent among the richest. Little variation is found as well in the method mix between women in different per capita consumption quintiles, although poorer women tend to rely more on the IUD and less on traditional methods. There is, however, substantial variation in the source of contraceptives. More than half of the poorest women (54 percent) obtained their contraceptives from commune health centers, compared to only 21 percent of women in the richest quintile. In contrast, about one-quarter (26 percent) of the rich obtained contraceptives from hospitals, compared to only 11 percent of poor women. Since the unit costs of family planning services (which are equal to unit subsi-dies in this case) are much higher in hospitals, these data suggest that the rich may be capturing proportionately more family planning program subsidies than the poor.
Since one of the reasons most often given for subsidizing these services is to help the poor, an important question is what share of the total subsidy is reaching its target. In the public economics literature, the share of governmental subsidies received by different income groups is referred to as "benefit incidence" (Jimenez 1995; van de Walle and Nead 1995; Pradhan 1996) . Estimates of the benefit incidence of family planning services are presented in Table 2 . 33 In cases where the percentage of subsidies received by the poorest quintile exceeds their share of the population (20 percent)-as is not the case in Table 2 -the subsidies are considered to be strongly pro-poor (or relatively efficient in targeting the poor). The Lorenz distribution of subsidies is the cumulative percentage of subsidies received by a given quintile as well as by all poorer quintiles. A completely equal Lorenz distribution would have the same cumulative distribution as the quintile populations (i.e., 20 percent, 40 percent, 60 percent, 80 percent, 100 percent). 34 If the Lorenz distribution of subsidies is more equal than the corresponding distribution of total consumption per capita-as is the case in Table 2 -the subsidies are considered to be weakly pro-poor (i.e., the subsidies in this case improve the overall distribution of consumption). In Vietnam's weakly pro-poor family planning program, the poorest per capita consumption quintile receives 15 percent of the total governmental family planning benefits (i.e., public subsidies). Although this is less than their share of the population (20 percent, by definition of a quintile), it is substantially more than their share of total private consumption (9 percent). 35 In Table 2 the poorest two quintiles receive 36 percent of the total benefits, almost as much as their share of the population (40 percent) and substantially more than their share of total private consumption (22 percent). These results for the poorest 40 percent of the population are directly comparable to similar benefit incidence estimates for public health programs in other Asian countries (Pradhan 1996) , for example, Malaysia in 1974 (47 percent), Philippines in 1975 (27 percent), Sri Lanka in 1978 (46 percent), and Indonesia in 1978 (19 percent) and to an estimate of the benefit incidence of curative care subsidies received by the poorest 40 percent of the population (28 percent) in Vietnam (World Bank 1995) .
In Vietnam, the main source of inequality in the distribution of family planning benefits received stems from the greater use of more heavily subsidized governmental providers (i.e., hospitals) by the higher income quintiles. As noted, for example, 26 percent of contraceptive users in the richest quintile obtain their contraceptives from governmental hospitals, compared to only 11 percent of those in the poorest quintile. In contrast only 21 percent of contraceptive users in the richest quintile obtain their services at a commune health center (the least expensive source), compared to 54 percent of those in the poorest quintile. In addition to differences in the source mix, differences in contraceptive prevalence (relatively small in Vietnam) and in the proportion of married women of reproductive age in the population (18 percent of the richest quintile, compared to 14 percent of the poorest quintile) also contribute to inequality in the distribution of benefits. Partly offsetting these factors is the observation that 29 percent of those in the richest quintile obtain their services from the lightly subsidized private sector (i.e., private-sector subsidies are limited to the government's social marketing program).
A policy of charging fees for the relatively high-cost family planning services provided by hospitals would be likely to improve the distribution of family planning benefits in Vietnam.
36 At present, the government provides much higher subsidies (in absolute terms) to family planning services obtained from hospitals than it provides for services obtained from commune health centers, polyclinics, and family planning centers. Since the relatively well-off urban population lives close to hospitals, they are in a better position to (and do in fact) capture the bulk of these generous subsidies. If instead the subsidy per acceptor at hospitals were reduced to the level received by acceptors at commune health centers and family planning centers (i.e., about 130,000 VND per acceptor), the share of subsidies received by the poorest two quintiles would increase from 36 to 41 percent (i.e., to more than their share of the population), while the share received by the richest quintile would decrease from 29 to 21 percent (i.e., program benefits would be distributed almost proportionately across quintiles). In addition, such a policy change would be likely to shift some rich acceptors away from more expensive sources of family planning services (since they would be receiving more appropriate price signals), simultaneously improving overall program efficiency.
Key policy issues in population and reproductive health
In this section we apply the policy framework developed earlier to a set of policy issues in the areas of population and reproductive health that have important economic dimensions. These include: pricing and cost recovery; access and quality; the role of the private sector; targets, incentives, and unmet need; decentralization; sustainability; and evaluation.
Pricing and cost recovery
Many family planning and reproductive health programs provide services free of charge to the entire population, and financing these programs has become burdensome in many developing countries. One response has been to consider charging fees for these services. Although charging fees has the potential to recover a significant share of costs, concern is often expressed that it will reduce prevalence levels and impose a burden on the poor. Other issues relate to how high fees should be (i.e., what percentage of costs should be recovered) and how fees should be set for different contraceptive methods. The issues raised with respect to family planning financing apply equally to reproductive health services.
According to the policy framework, all health services (including family planning services), whether produced by the government or by the private sector, should be priced so that the social marginal benefit of the last unit consumed is equal to its social marginal cost. Unless a situation such as that depicted in Figures 2 or 3 exists, the normal operation of competitive markets should ensure that this occurs. If not, methods such as those illustrated in the Indonesian example should be used to find an appropriate level of subsidy (or tax). If a case can be made for subsidizing governmental services on efficiency grounds, the same subsidy should be extended to private providers. Failure to extend the same subsidies to the private sector as the public sector receives puts the private sector at a competitive disadvantage and risks losing the potential gains in efficiency that may be obtained by strengthening competition between public-and private-sector producers.
The same principles should be used to determine subsidies, if needed, for individual contraceptive methods. In general, they imply that prices (and subsidies) for different methods should be roughly proportional to their marginal cost, so that the fee charged for a sterilization or implant should in most cases be significantly higher than that for an IUD insertion. For a given method, the same absolute subsidy should be given to each provider (including private providers). Actual pricing policy often departs from these principles, however, as the Vietnam example above illustrates; more expensive methods and services typically receive higher subsidies to make them affordable. In many programs, all services regardless of cost are provided free. Varying the subsidies from one method or source to another, in ways other than those dictated by applying the principles presented in the policy framework, creates the wrong incentives for consumers and encourages inefficient contraceptive choices.
37 It can also exacerbate distributional inequities, as the Vietnam example illustrates. The level of subsidy should not depend on the perceived "cost-effectiveness" of the method unless society is sufficiently committed to the goal of reducing fertility so that it is prepared to define social marginal benefits very narrowly as a method's effectiveness in averting births.
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Certainly, pricing population and reproductive health services according to efficiency principles may hurt the poor in comparison with free provision (just as competitive pricing of food, housing, and clothing may hurt the poor in comparison with free provision). They will be hurt whether or not they reduce their consumption of the service. At times it is suggested that they will be hurt more if they reduce their use of such services substantially because of price increases (e.g., Gertler, Locay, and Sanderson 1987) . But in fact they will probably be hurt more by increased prices because of "cost recovery" applied to services that induce little or no reduction in use (i.e., demand is inelastic) than they are by price increases that result in large reductions of quantities demanded (i.e., for which there are close substitutes so demand is elastic). If the poor can readily substitute other goods and services (e.g., additional food purchases) for family planning services if the price of the latter increases, this may be of concern to the public health specialist and the family planning worker. But it may be of less concern to the poor themselves because they are able to substitute consumption of other goods and services with little loss of welfare (see Deaton 1997: 206-210 for a discussion of related issues).
That the poor may reduce their use of family planning and reproductive health services because of price increases as part of cost recovery efforts, however, does not imply that continuing to subsidize all such services necessarily helps the poor. If certain services have a high income elasticity of demand, for example, most of the subsidy will be captured by upper-income groups, as in the case of hospital-based subsidies noted earlier.
In such cases, the poor would be better off if the funds were used to subsidize the goods and services of which they consume proportionately more.
Access and quality
The family planning and reproductive health community frequently identifies "access" and "quality" as program objectives in addition to efficiency, distribution (or equity), and "sustainability" (discussed below). "Access" is usually defined as the absence of economic and physical barriers that keep a prospective client away from a service delivery point; "quality" is usually defined as the factors that determine whether the care is effective and acceptable to the client once she or he walks through the door. Particularly in the family planning literature, optimal levels of access and quality are defined as those that maximize use and impact on fertility. Thus, for example, contraceptives are delivered free of charge to a client's doorstep (taking access to the limits), and governmental family planning programs are criticized for their poor quality if they do not provide a full range of contraceptive methods (the "cafeteria approach"), citing evidence that continuing use increases with the number of methods available.
Although these concepts are undoubtedly useful to policymakers within the population and reproductive health communities, they are confusing from the perspective of our economic framework because "access" and "quality" considerations are included in the concept of efficiency. Standard economic principles support improved access (e.g., bringing services closer to clients) up to the point where the social marginal benefits of doing so are equal to the social marginal cost. Goods and services of varying qualities are effectively distinct goods and services, and the normal functioning of markets (assuming consumers are well informed) provides an optimal mix of goods and services of different qualities (i.e., the mix that responds to consumer demand). Unless a situation such as that depicted in Figure 2 or 3 is present, the normal operation of competitive markets should result in optimal "access" and "quality." If this is not the case, the methods illustrated in the Indonesian example can be used to determine optimal levels of subsidies (or taxes) that should then be applied to all producers, public and private. If consumers cannot be relied upon to make "good" quality choices in the market for health services, this is a problem of lack of information and should be addressed as such.
If governments have an effective monopoly in the provision of certain services, which can easily occur if they are financed mainly out of governmental budgets, problems of poor access and quality often arise. Decisions about the location of governmental health facilities are often made on the basis of political considerations, rather than efficiency and distribution. Governmental providers have little incentive to offer good quality services; and they tend to provide a more limited range of service quality than do private providers. The poor quality of governmental services often is a consequence of a lack of competition from private providers. Policies that subsidize governmental providers, but not private providers, are the source of the problem. The solution is to eliminate subsidies to governmental providers (i.e., charging fees that reflect full marginal costs) or, if justified on either efficiency or distributional grounds, provide subsidies equally to all providers. Special quality improvement programs directed to governmental providers are not nearly as high in the policy hierarchy as solutions to problems of poor-quality governmental services.
The role of the private sector
The policy framework presented in this article suggests that most goods and services should normally be provided by an approximately competitive private (or mixed public and private) sector with numerous suppliers. Because of the difficulties in assuring the right incentives for governmental providers, direct governmental provision of services is unlikely to be high in the policy hierarchy except under unusual circumstances. In markets where social marginal benefits exceed private marginal benefits, the preferred solution is to offer subsidies to private providers (or to consumers) rather than to have governments provide services directly. The main exception to this rule occurs when the relevant market is too small to support more than one seller of a good or service that is not easily imported from other regions or from abroad, so that a monopoly is likely to result. Even in this case, however, regulated private monopolies are likely to be preferred to a governmental producer because of the problems in creating incentives for efficient behavior for governmental producers, problems that are exacerbated by limited information. If governments are to provide services efficiently, in general they must be encouraged to compete on a level playing field with the private sector.
There is a common perception that the private sector is more efficient than the public sector. The profit motive is credited with providing private managers with the incentive to be more efficient. Governmental providers may be efficient (and there are numerous examples of efficient governmental providers of goods and services), but when they are it is usually because they function like private providers in a competitive market environment. Monopolistic governmental agencies financed out of a central budget are rarely efficient and are often highly inefficient. Their payrolls are usually swollen with redundant, poorly trained and equipped personnel, often with ties to the political leadership. As noted above, they are often incapable of providing the kinds and variety of services that consumers demand (i.e., services of the "right" quality). These are some of the reasons that governments around the world are rapidly "privatizing" often enormously inefficient government-owned and -operated enterprises in a wide range of industries. It is because of the typically poor performance of many governmental providers of social services that many economists favor the use of demand-side subsidies (e.g., voucher schemes) to consumers that "empower" them to choose freely between public and private providers.
In contrast, the widespread view within many family planning and reproductive health programs is that the government's mission is to serve the poor while those able to pay for services should be served by the private sector. This view mistakenly confuses a perceived need to finance services for the poor, which may be an appropriate mission of governments on distributional grounds, with the need to produce the services themselves, which should not normally be the mission of governments. It is sometimes argued that governmental providers alone are located in the remote rural areas where most of the poor live. One reason for this, however, is that governmental subsidies (i.e., selective supply-side subsidies) are only provided to governmental providers. If subsidies were instead provided directly to consumers (i.e., demand-side subsidies in the form of vouchers), so that private providers would be able to compete with governmental providers, a more balanced mix of public and private providers might be found even in relatively remote locations. The resulting competition, by promoting greater efficiency, would benefit the predominantly poor populations of such communities.
In summary, the implication of the economic framework is for policy to be neutral regardless of ownership of producers of goods and services. If the private sector produces the same (or better) services at lower cost (i.e., through its greater efficiency) than governmental producers, then private suppliers should dominate for all income groups, including the poor. The role of the private sector should not be limited to saving the government's money by attracting rich and middle-income clients away from highly subsidized government-provided services. On the contrary, if subsidies are provided to consumers to improve efficiency (e.g., because social marginal benefits exceed private marginal benefits) the private sector should receive the same subsidies. 39 Higher up in the policy hierarchy, the government can reduce the use of scarce resources by ceasing to provide subsidized services to groups capable of paying for them through improved targeting. 40 
Targets, incentives, and unmet need
Many population programs in Asia have aggressively pursued demographic targets in an effort to reduce their fertility rates as quickly as possible. Such target-setting often reflects a strong belief on the part of policymakers that reducing population growth would significantly increase the pace of the country's development. In several countries, women and men have been offered incentive payments to be sterilized, and women in some cases have been offered payments to have an IUD inserted (Ross and Isaacs 1988) . 41 In terms of the policy framework, these governments apparently perceive that the social marginal benefit curve lies so far to the right of the private marginal benefit curve (compare to Figure 2 ) that using subsidies to reduce the price to zero would not be sufficient to achieve the level of contraception at which the social marginal benefit is equal to the social marginal cost (i.e., to induce use at H** implies a negative price).
Although some countries still pay incentives to contraceptive acceptors (Vietnam is an example), the practice has not spread much in recent years. Family planning supporters generally frown on the use of incentives for several reasons. First, they are difficult to administer (because they involve cash payments), and the task of financing such payments increases the burden on limited governmental budgets. Second, incentives are often viewed as coercive because the poor find it difficult to refuse such cash payments, so that the payment of incentives effectively infringes on their reproductive rights. Since most of those expressing such concerns favor subsidizing family planning and reproductive health services, the position seems to be that subsidies are acceptable as long as the price of services does not drop below zero, at which point they become coercive. 42 Although it is granted that both subsidies and incentives may affect the behavior of the poor more than the rich, most subsidies would be coercive according to such a definition (Mason 1994) . For example, even providing modest subsidies to family planning and reproductive health services instead of using the same funds to subsidize food or other types of health services would be coercive because it is more likely to affect the choices made by the poor than by the rich. Taking a strong position against the payment of incentives prevents their possible use in ways that might promote reproductive rights, such as using cash payments to effectively "buy off" men's opposition to women's expressed desires to use contraceptives in settings where other measures (e.g., improved information to men on the potential economic and health benefits of child spacing) may prove to be ineffective.
At the 1994 Cairo International Conference on Population and Development the international population community rejected the use of demographic targets in population programs. Instead, programs were encouraged to reorient themselves to the goal of satisfying "unmet need" (Cohen and Richards 1994) . Although conceptually this reorientation moves population policy away from its more narrow focus on demographic targets to one closer in spirit to "welfare" or "utility" (i.e., programs are designed to meet the "needs" of their clients), the concept of unmet need is sufficiently different from the concept of demand that it cannot be integrated easily into the policy framework presented above (and is accordingly difficult to use as a basis for project evaluation of the type illustrated in our Indonesian example). 43 Although the concept of unmet need is relevant in establishing that a need exists (at least technically, if not in the mind or behav-ior of the survey respondent) and may be useful in mobilizing political and financial support for family planning programs from some constituencies, it is unlikely to be convincing to economists in ministries of finance or in international agencies, who are likely to question why this particular unmet need should be funded by the government (as compared to unmet needs for items such as food, clothing, fuel, or housing). The policy framework is potentially far more useful as a basis for convincing such economists to support funding for population and reproductive health programs.
Decentralization
Health and population programs are being decentralized in many countries. At one extreme, such decentralization may be limited to the administration of otherwise centrally directed governmental programs. For example, a provincial department may be authorized to incur expenses for some items against a centrally determined budget. More substantial, but still limited, forms of decentralization may permit local authorities to develop their own budgets (usually subject to central approval). In some decentralizations, local administrations (and even individual health facilities) may also be permitted to establish and collect fees for health services and be permitted to retain most of the revenue for uses they determine. Typically one of the last powers to be devolved from central to local authorities is the power to hire, fire, and determine the compensation levels of personnel; this function is usually retained by central or regional governments. Full decentralization would also include the power to supplement central revenues with locally levied and collected taxes, so that localities can effectively decide how much and on what to spend.
Viewed from an economic perspective (as distinct from a political or managerial perspective), decentralization has potentially important implications for efficiency and distribution. In terms of efficiency, arguments have been advanced to support the idea that decentralization leads to improved efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of governmental services (Tanzi 1995) . First, different geographical areas may have distinct preferences for governmental services. If the level and composition of services are determined locally, consumers may be able to attain higher levels of welfare using fewer resources. Second, with decentralization, one locality may compete with other localities to provide the best public services for given taxes. Third, decentralization may encourage experimentation with alternative approaches to providing public services. Fourth, decentralization can provide better accountability if local officials are directly responsible for the provision of locally consumed services.
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Against these potential efficiency advantages of decentralization, a number of counter-arguments advanced in the economic literature may be relevant to the decentralized provision of population and reproductive health services. First, central governments should be able to obtain sufficient information about local preferences to tailor services appropriately (although the costs in doing so may be considerable). Second, the argument that decentralization provides a better means of registering local preferences assumes that local governments are responsive to preferences of constituents-that sometimes is translated to mean that they are democratically elected. 45 Third, corruption may be greater with decentralization if, as has been suggested, local bureaucrats tend to be less scrupulous than central bureaucrats (Prud'homme 1995; Tanzi 1995) . Fourth, the quality of local bureaucrats, and consequently their effectiveness as managers, may be lower than that of central bureaucrats. Fifth, on the revenue side, some types of local taxes may be relatively expensive to collect and may distort economic activity more than taxes collected at the central level.
In terms of distribution, it is frequently argued that decentralization is likely to worsen regional disparities (Prud'homme 1995). On the expenditure side, under conditions in which there are wide differences in average income levels among localities, decentralization can reduce the capacity of the central government to redistribute resources from rich localities to poor ones. On the revenue side, some types of local taxes may be inequitable in their incidence.
At a minimum, decentralization may pose major challenges for population and reproductive health programs. Local governments may not view social benefits and costs in the same way as central governments (and donors), and their views will eventually be expressed in the allocation of resources at the local level. Central governments may need to resist such changes by developing matching grant programs that attempt to influence local resource allocations; but it is often difficult to monitor compliance with the conditions of such grants. A more common solution is to provide some types of services (e.g., those where social benefits and costs differ significantly from private benefits and costs) through centrally funded and directed vertical programs (e.g., Vietnam's family planning program).
46 Decentralization also requires an effective formula for revenue sharing between the central government and local governments to preserve distributional objectives.
Sustainability
The concept of sustainability concerns the capacity of a donor-funded project to continue producing the benefits it is expected to provide (e.g., those that were projected in its cost-benefit analysis) beyond the period for which financing and other inputs are provided by a donor. For example, if the project provides funds for a capital investment, will the beneficiary agency (usually a government or nongovernmental organization) be able to mobilize the recurrent expenditure to operate the capital investment when project support terminates? Although the primary focus of sustainability is financial, the concept has been broadened to consider the beneficiary's institutional and managerial capacity to continue generating projected benefits of an investment beyond the life of an externally funded project. It is widely accepted that projects that in their initial stage provide support also for recurrent expenditures are more difficult to sustain than those that provide support only for capital investments.
Sustainability is a major problem for many population projects, and concern is often expressed also for the sustainability of family planning and reproductive health programs. One reason for such concerns is that donor projects in these areas often provide support for recurrent expenditure in the form of donated contraceptives and other supplies. Some projects also supplement staff salaries and administrative costs, particularly in the case of projects involving NGOs. A desire to provide services to clients as quickly and reliably as possible is often the reason for funding a broader range of inputs. It is also true that in the early stages of governmental programs, domestic support is often weak and there is no presumption that the necessary recurrent expenditure would be forthcoming in the absence of donor funding.
Given concerns for the sustainability of family planning and reproductive health programs, some donors have funded entire projects designed to promote sustainability. The problem is perceived to be particularly acute in the case of NGOs, which tend to receive a very high share of their recurrent budgets from donor funding and have only limited opportunities for obtaining alternative sources of funding. Cost recovery is often advocated or strengthened as one way to replace donor funding. The problem is that as fees rise, the characteristics of the clients served tend to change, with the result that a smaller share of the remaining subsidies reaches the poor (as can be examined through benefit incidence studies, such as that presented above on Vietnam). "Cross-subsidizing" is another common strategy frequently supported by sustainability projects. As an example, an NGO may establish a clinic in a higher income location and charge fees that more than cover its costs, using the surplus to support its operations in low-income areas. Cross-subsidizing activities, although they are sometimes generously funded by donors, rarely succeed (Janowitz and Gould 1993). 47 In the context of the policy framework, however, sustainability may be a less serious problem. To begin with, governments should not in most cases provide family planning and reproductive health services directly.
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As argued above, the ultimate objective should not be to have heavily subsidized governmental providers serving the poor while a self-sufficient private sector serves the rich and middle-income groups. If governmental financing is justified on either efficiency or distribution grounds, the preference should be for demand-side subsidies (e.g., vouchers) provided directly to target groups of consumers (e.g., the poor). In addition to fostering competition and therefore efficiency, the use of targeted demandside subsidies also helps to resolve the problem of sustainability. In the case of NGOs, for example, those that are able to control their costs and compete effectively for consumers' business (including the business of those consumers who are equipped with vouchers) will survive; the rest will fail. Governmental programs probably will (and probably should) disappear if they show themselves less able to compete with commercial and NGO providers.
The issue of sustainability also raises questions about the long-run role, if any, for donors in the area of population and reproductive health. It is easy to justify a role for donors when situations such as those depicted in Figures 2 and 3 are present but where governments either refuse to intervene because of perceived political, religious, or cultural constraints or are unable to intervene because of financial constraints. There is a danger in such cases, however, that governments will become dependent on continuing donor funding, with the necessary governmental resources never becoming available. In such cases it is important to establish realistic targets for governmental funding, with the stipulation that funds be made equally available to private providers (so that one group of providers does not become dependent on donor resources), ideally through the use of demand-side subsidies. It is also important for donors to continually reassess the need for subsidies in the context of the policy framework. If, for example, the original justification for subsidies was to improve the flow of information to consumers, subsidies can be reduced or eliminated when consumers demonstrate an acceptable knowledge of the services.
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Evaluation
The careful evaluation of governmental policies in population and reproductive health and other human resources can be one of the most costeffective uses of scarce resources. Nevertheless, a major problem from the perspective of our framework is that much of the existing evaluation of family planning and reproductive health service impact focuses exclusively on changes in fertility and health status. This is consistent with the traditional emphasis placed by programs on narrowly defined goals, as opposed to improving individual and social welfare more broadly conceived. Future evaluations of population and reproductive health programs should focus not only on fertility and health impacts but also on whether resources are allocated in such a way as to improve efficiency and equity. For example, if the rationale for governmental funding of population programs is that private markets do not produce enough information about family planning options, evaluations should focus on how much program funding is allocated to effective information-increasing activities and whether improvements in consumer knowledge are registered. Whether this leads to reduc-tions in fertility may not be important from a broader welfare perspective, as long as consumers are making informed decisions. If individuals act in their own best interests, what is important is that they face appropriate private incentives to make fertility and other decisions that reflect true marginal social costs and benefits. If, as another example, the primary rationale for subsidizing family planning and reproductive health services is to ensure that the poor have access to them, evaluations should focus on the share of program subsidies actually received by the poor (as illustrated in the Vietnam example). In the past, such evaluations have been conducted only in rare instances. However, they are likely to be the kinds of evaluations that are persuasive to economists in ministries of finance and in international organizations with whom advocates of family planning and reproductive health are increasingly likely to have to negotiate over resource availability.
Summary and conclusions
Our main objective in this article has been to provide a standard economic framework to evaluate policies in the population and reproductive health field and to illustrate its use. We hope that this will facilitate cross-disciplinary exchanges between economists and others working in the population and reproductive health fields and will enable those working in population and reproductive health to be more effective in communicating their analytical insights and concerns to those outside the field with a primary background in economics. The standard economic framework presented justifies governmental policy interventions in population and reproductive health (and in other areas) in terms of two distinct objectives: 1) to increase efficiency and productivity; and 2) to redistribute resources. We have suggested that it is both practical and informative to use this framework to evaluate projects and policies. The article leads to a number of policy-relevant conclusions, which are summarized below.
First, it is desirable to analyze the efficiency gains of projects and policy changes in the population and reproductive health field using a standard welfare economics framework in the context of cost-benefit analysis. Use of such a framework is consistent with current practice in other areas of human resource economics and is preferable to the use of traditional costbenefit and cost-effectiveness methodologies that emphasize either narrower objectives (e.g., per capita income growth, governmental financial savings) or more diffuse ones (e.g., poverty reduction, environmental improvement, human capital formation, health, empowerment of women). The article has illustrated how this can be done using as an example the cost-benefit analysis of a safe motherhood project in Indonesia.
Second, more attention should be given to the evaluation of distributional objectives in family planning and reproductive health programs. Im-proving access of the poor to such services is often a stated justification for these programs, yet little attention has been given to evaluating the degree to which the poor benefit from these programs. The article has illustrated how such distributional assessments can be done, using a "benefit incidence" study of Vietnam's family planning program.
Third, application of the policy framework to a number of important resource-and finance-related issues in the population and reproductive health field (pricing and cost recovery, access and quality, role of the private sector, use of targets and incentives, decentralization, sustainability, and evaluation) suggests that a significant program bias favors publicly provided services and hinders the emergence of a more efficient mix of private and public providers competing on an equal basis. The article argues that many of the problems that economists and others working in these fields confront could be lessened or resolved by shifting from policies that emphasize continuing supply-side subsidies to public providers through governmental budgets to policies that make greater use of targeted demandside subsidies to consumers (e.g., vouchers) that would empower them to choose between competing governmental, NGO, and commercial providers.
Appendix: Cost-benefit analysis of an Indonesian safe motherhood project 1. IEC Component. If the marginal cost of professionally assisted obstetric deliveries is constant (a reasonable assumption, since the main variable costs are the time of the village midwife and consumable supplies), welfare gains (triangle ABC in Figure 5 ) can be approximated by the following formula (Phelps 1992: 291) :
where M 1 in Figure 5 refers to the equilibrium level of use under conditions in which consumers are not fully informed, and M 2 refers to the equilibrium level of demand under conditions of full information. P 2 refers to the equilibrium price under conditions of full information (equal to marginal cost in this case), and P 1 refers to the price at which fully informed consumers would demand M 1 services. For small changes in price (dP) and service use (dM), and using an estimate of the price elasticity of demand (e), the term (P 1 -P 2 ) in equation (1) can be approximated by:
In a district of one million people in which the crude birth rate is 20 per 1,000 population, there would be approximately 20,000 births annu-ally. According to data from the 1994 Demographic and Health Survey, the proportion of births in East and Central Java (the project site) that are attended by a trained provider (a doctor or nurse/midwife) are 35 and 27 percent respectively. However, the proportion of births attended by a trained provider among those with some secondary (or higher) education is 72 percent (also reported to be 71 percent in Bali and 70 percent in West Sumatra). If the proportion of births attended by a trained provider increases from 30 to 70 percent as the result of information provided by the project, the number of professionally attended deliveries would increase from about 6,000 annually to about 14,000 annually (i.e., dM = 8,000). Assuming that the price elasticity of demand for such services is -0.3 and that village midwives charge 50,000 rupiah to attend a delivery, 50 the annual welfare gains for a single district of one million people can be estimated approximately as:
Welfare gains = 0.5 [ (8,000/6,000) 50,000 (1/0.3) ] 8,000 = 889 million rupiah = $378,573 per million population ($0.38 per capita) 51 2. Emergency obstetric care insurance. Assuming 10 percent of pregnant women have a risk of being hospitalized for complications related to pregnancy or delivery, that 7 percent of these will require nonsurgical interventions during three days of hospitalization at a cost to the woman of $50 per day, or a total of $150 (345,000 rupiah), and that the remaining 3 percent will require surgery (e.g., cesarian section) and will be charged $350 (805,000 rupiah) for seven days of hospitalization at $50 per day, a pregnant woman has an expected uninsured loss (risk) of $21 with a variance of $4,809.
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The project is assumed to provide insurance to pregnant women to cover these risks with a 20 percent copayment (i.e., the insurer reimburses only 80 percent of the referral hospital costs, or $16.80, with the woman or her family being responsible for paying the remaining 20 percent, or $4.10). However, because such an insurance policy would change the effective price of hospital care to the woman (i.e., from $50 per day to $10 per day), there is likely to be some increase in the use of hospital services (e.g., in the average length of stay). If the price elasticity of demand for hospital services is -0.1 (fairly inelastic), the average length of stay would increase by 8 percent (e.g., from 3 to 3.24 days, or from 7 to 7.56 days, on average). The expected loss (risk) to the insured person in this example becomes $4.54 (i.e., increases by 8 percent, from $4.20 to $4.54) and the variance of the risk becomes $224 (i.e., insurance reduces the expected risk by $16.46 and its variance by $4,585).
The welfare gains from insurance (i.e., the risk premium) can be estimated using the following formula (Phelps 1992: 286):
Welfare gains from insurance = 0.5 * r(I) * (reduction in the variance of the risk), where r(I) is a measure of the degree of the average consumer's risk aversion. 53 Assuming that the poor rural consumers who would benefit from this insurance program have an average annual income of $200, a value of r(I) = 0.002 would correspond to an income elasticity of the marginal utility of income of 0.4. Under these assumptions, the welfare gains from insurance are estimated to be $4.58 per insured person.
There are two components to the cost of providing such insurance. The first is the welfare loss from the 8 percent increase in service use that is attributed to moral hazard (i.e., triangle CDE in Figure 6 ). This can be estimated using the formula in equations (1) and (2) above. In this case, the consumer's expected loss attributed to moral hazard is approximately $0.67. The second component of cost is the administrative, or "loading," cost of providing the insurance. If loading costs are assumed to be 10 percent of the insurer's paid benefit ($18.14 in the present case), they would be $1.81 per insured person. Total cost, therefore, is estimated to be $2.48; and the benefit-cost ratio is ($4.58/$2.48) = 1.85.
Notes
The original version of this article was prepared for the Program in Population Sciences of the Rockefeller Foundation. Behrman and Knowles alone, and not the Rockefeller Foundation, have full responsibility for the contents of the article. Correspondence should be sent to Jere R. Behrman, Economics, McNeil 160, 3718 Locust Walk, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297; telephone 215 898 7704, fax 215 898 2124, e-mail jbehrman@econ.sas.upenn.edu. 1 Note that economic efficiency is not the same as engineering efficiency because of the incorporation of marginal benefits and marginal costs rather than an exclusive focus on technological efficiency.
2 The social marginal benefits also could be lower than the private marginal benefits so that the social marginal benefits curve is below the private marginal benefits curve, and policies to attain efficiency would have to reduce the private incentives to the social levels. benefits of such information provision accrue to all producers equally. In noncompetitive markets, there is some incentive for individual producers to provide information to consumers, but (except in the case of pure monopoly) the incentive exists mainly to attract consumers to a particular producer (i.e., to promote brand loyalty), rather than to provide generic information bearing on the issue of whether and how much of the good or service a consumer should purchase from a social perspective. Under these circumstances, one might expect that a private market providing information directly to consumers would fill the gap. However, the "public good" nature of information (i.e., that the marginal cost of providing information to another consumer is virtually zero) leads to underproduction of information from a social point of view by private markets because private providers cannot cover their costs if they price information at the social marginal cost as required for efficiency.
6 These are major reasons why a divergence may arise between private and social marginal benefits for investments in population and reproductive health, although there may be other factors as well (e.g., the social discount rate may be lower than the private discount rate, wage and price rigidities may preclude wages and prices from reflecting social marginal benefits and costs, income taxes may cause private marginal returns to human capital investments to be lower than social marginal returns).
7 The social marginal costs also could be higher than the private marginal costs, in which case policies to attain efficiency would have to reduce the private incentives to the social levels.
8 These considerations are part of what economists refer to as the "theory of the second best." For example, eliminating monopoly pricing that restricts output in an industry that is a heavy polluter would be unlikely to improve efficiency.
9 Economic "rents" are returns to fixed supplies. Because the supplies are fixed, the rents gained by their owners do not affect the quantities supplied. If supplies are fixed, for example, by regulations, rents are created by the supply restrictions, so there are incentives for various private and public entities to try to obtain these rents ("rent-seeking"). Rent-seeking uses resources and transfers income among various groups, but does not add to production. 10 Below, we present an example of distortionary costs arising in connection with the provision of emergency obstetric care insurance in Indonesia.
11 If the policies involve public expenditures, as most do, it is important to consider the cost of raising the necessary tax revenue to finance the policy. In the United States, for example, it has been estimated that the distortionary cost (often called the "deadweight loss") of raising a dollar of tax revenue ranges from $0.17 to $1.00, depending on the type of tax involved (e.g., Feldstein 1995).
12 Nevertheless there are likely to be some cases, such as providing information on the quality of goods and services related to population and reproductive health investments, for which quantitative regulations may be higher in the policy hierarchy than price policies because of the nature of the information requirements.
13 Below, we provide an example of a fertility control policy that is not well focused (viz., charging fees for obstetric delivery care only for third and subsequent births) and that has negative distributional and health effects.
14 Even redistributing income may lead to inefficiency because it can affect the work effort of those on both the tax-paying and tax-receiving sides.
15 However, household decisionmakers may reallocate resources, so that the intended recipients of such policies receive much smaller benefits than intended (e.g., children receiving subsidized food at school may be fed less at home).
16 In the context of such an objective it is important for governments to decide whether success is to be measured in outcomes (health status), utilization (health clinic use), or access (ability to consume a package of basic services regardless of income level).
17 For an introduction to and an extensive overview of both methods, see Warner and Luce (1982) , Sirageldin, Salkever, and Osborn (1983) , and Evans and Hurley (1995) .
For a recent review of the use of both methodologies in family planning, see Knowles (1997b) .
18 See for example Coale and Hoover (1958) , Enke (1966 Enke ( , 1971 , Robinson and Horlacher (1969) , Simon (1969 Simon ( , 1977 , Zaidan (1969 Zaidan ( , 1971 , Sommers and Suits (1971) , Suits et al. (1975) , Sommers (1980) , and Chao and Allen (1984) . In contrast, there have been few applications of cost-benefit analysis to reproductive health, with the exception of analyses focused on AIDS (e.g., Bloom and Lyons 1993 , Bloom and Mahal 1997 , Cuddington 1993 , Cuddington and Hancock 1994 , Kambou, Devarajan, and Over 1992 .
19 Such a welfare economics approach to defining the benefits of family planning projects was proposed over two decades ago by Haveman (1976) , but it has not been widely practiced in health and population project appraisal and evaluation until recently.
20 The costs should include both the direct costs of the subsidy program (e.g., the administrative costs of a voucher scheme) and the distortionary costs involved in financing the subsidy by raising additional tax revenue (as noted above, these costs are frequently estimated to be large relative to the actual tax revenue raised). The costs should not include the subsidy itself (which is a transfer payment) or the cost of the family planning services themselves (which are already reflected in the social marginal cost curve-i.e., equal to the pre-subsidy private marginal cost curve).
21 Even Enke's pathbreaking cost-benefit analysis (1966) devoted more space to an extensive cost-effectiveness analysis of alternative contraceptive methods.
22 Recent examples include Simmons, Balk, and Faiz (1991) , Vernon et al. (1994) , Foreit, de Castro, and Duarte Franco (1989) , Coeytaux et al. (1989) , Foreit et al. (1993) .
23 As in applications of the Global Burden of Disease methodology (World Bank 1993a; Cochrane and Sai 1993; Walsh et al. 1993; Cochrane, Guilkey, and Akin 1994) .
24 It is sometimes suggested that costbenefit analysis is appropriate to use in considering the overall share of resources devoted to population and reproductive health interventions, but that once this share has been determined (or if it is politically moot), cost-effectiveness analysis becomes the appropriate technique for choosing among individual projects and program activities. A problem with such a policy strategy is that it fails to consider on a case-by-case basis the rationale for intervening in private markets.
25 For example, in the case of family planning services, if cost-effectiveness ratios use a health measure in the denominator (e.g., disability-adjusted life years, or DALYs), they completely neglect the non-health-related benefits to couples from preventing or delaying births. If, instead, a measure of births averted is used in the denominator, health effects are ignored, such as when (as often has occurred in such analyses) condoms are found not to be cost-effective because their role in reducing sexually transmitted diseases is ignored or when the sterilization of older (relatively infecund) women is found not to be cost-effective because its role in preventing maternal and neonatal mortality and morbidity is ignored.
26 Data from the 1993 Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) show that midwives working in both the public and private sectors are the modern maternal health care providers of choice for most Indonesian women (Serrato and Melnick 1995) . However, the IFLS shows that Indonesian women also have a strong preference for giving birth at home (84 percent of rural births and 44 percent of urban births); and traditional birth attendants are the most common providers attending home births (74 percent of home births, compared to 19 percent of home births attended by midwives).
27 Data on patterns of use of safe motherhood services from the 1993 IFLS and 1994 Indonesia Demographic and Health Survey show that educated women exhibit very different patterns of use from those of uneducated women. For example, data from the 1993 IFLS indicate that 85 percent of women without any education had their births attended by a traditional birth attendant, compared to only 18 percent of women who had completed middle school (Serrato and Melnick 1995) . These marked differentials by education are in contrast to the situation in family planning where, for example, data from the 1994 DHS indicate that 83 percent of women without any schooling know at least one modern contraceptive method and where to obtain it (Central Bureau of Statistics 1995).
28 Strictly speaking, "moral hazard" refers to an insured person engaging in more risky behavior as a result of being insured (e.g., an insured bank makes riskier loans); in the health economics literature, the term refers to a simple movement along the demand curve in response to a price change.
29 This is an example of a distortionary cost attendant on a governmental policy intervention, as discussed above.
30 This parameter affects the relative values a consumer places on large losses (e.g., the cost of an expensive hospitalization) as compared to relatively small losses (e.g., payment of an insurance premium) and is at the heart of the valuation of welfare gains associated with risk pooling. Unfortunately, there is no empirical basis for this assumption (because utility is not measurable). However, the estimates can be calculated for a range of plausible values of this parameter, and they can be checked against responses in surveys to questions measuring demand using the technique of contingent valuation. See Behrman and Knowles (1998b) for an application of contingent valuation to estimate the demand for health insurance.
31 Although knowledge of some contraceptive methods is widespread (IUDs, for example), knowledge of other methods is limited (Knodel et al. 1995) .
32 Consumption expenditures are used to represent income in much of the literature because they better represent longerrun income constraints than does measured annual income if there are large transitory income fluctuations and if households can smooth consumption over time. The principal data source is the Vietnam Social Sector Financing Survey (VNSSFS), which was conducted by the General Statistical Office (GSO) of the Government of Vietnam in January 1996 in collaboration with us, with funding from the Asian Development Bank. The VNSSFS was conducted in seven provinces, one from each administrative region of the country. It included a survey of 1,890 households and a series of commune, school, and health facility surveys. The VNSSFS was one module within a much larger multiround survey being conducted at the time by the GSO, i.e., the Multi-Objective Household Survey (MOHS), that covers 45,000 households in 1,500 communes located in all 53 provinces of Vietnam. For more information, see Behrman and Knowles (1998a) .
33 The estimates were obtained as follows. The annual service utilization rates by service delivery source were calculated as the product of the contraceptive prevalence rate (Table 1) , the proportion of married women of reproductive age in the total population (Table 2) , and the proportion of the target population using a given source (Table 1) . Benefit incidence was calculated as the product of annual service utilization rates and the unit (per acceptor) public subsidy (i.e., = unit public cost + unit incentive paid -fee revenue) by source (i.e., Central hospital VND 1,310,441, Provincial hospital VND 794,647, District hospital VND 538,029, Polyclinic VND 129,281, Commune health center VND 135,092, and Private VND 4,418). Targeting efficiency was calculated by computing each quintile's percentage share of total benefits. 34 As with income, the Gini coefficient (i.e., the ratio of the area between the plotted Lorenz distribution of income and a 45-degree line from the origin to the area of the triangle bordered by the 45-degree line) is a useful summary measure of the degree of inequality in benefit incidence. However, whereas the Gini coefficient for income varies between 0 (complete equality, i.e., everyone receives the same income) and 1 (complete inequality, i.e., all income is received by one person), the Gini coefficient for benefit incidence ranges between -1 (all subsidies received by the poorest person) and 1 (all subsidies received by the richest person). cover most, if not all, program costs. Otherwise, the effect of introducing fees may further limit access of the poor to the most heavily subsidized services (in absolute terms), so that an even higher share of program subsidies accrues to the rich. Such an adverse consequence of user fees actually occurs in the case of safe motherhood services in Vietnam (Behrman and Knowles 1998a) .
37 In some cases there may be a strong rationale for subsidizing certain contraceptive methods more heavily. The condom, for example, provides protection against sexually transmitted diseases and AIDS. Its use generates significant externalities to other consumers in the form of reduced risk of contracting these illnesses.
38 Even if, for example, long-term methods are more heavily subsidized because they are perceived to be more cost-effective in reducing fertility, the subsidy will be ineffective if demand for the method is highly inelastic (i.e., a price reduction does not encourage much additional demand). Even in a program with a narrowly defined goal of reducing fertility, optimal levels of subsidies can be determined only by considering both supply and demand factors (Hammer and Berman 1995) . 39 Indonesia's family planning program has for many years offered subsidies to both governmental and private providers, but it has often been criticized for offering subsidies to the latter because this is perceived as threatening the program's "sustainability." However, there is strong justification in our framework for offering subsidies equally to the public and private sectors, as long as subsidies can be justified, and for terminating subsidies to both sectors if they are not justifiable.
40 If means testing is impractical, the government may be able to target the poor through subsidizing goods and services that are mainly consumed by the poor or by focusing subsidies on geographical areas in which the poor are concentrated. In Indonesia's family planning program, for example, every household in the country is classified in January of each year into one of several "family welfare" groups on the basis of characteristics of their housing and lifestyles. Persons from households in the two lowest groups are eligible to receive family planning services free (Knowles 1996) . Indonesia also has developed a sophisticated system of geographical targeting of rural development loans and other interventions at the village level (World Bank 1993b).
41 Providers and community motivators also have received incentive payments in some countries, usually in connection with clients' acceptance of long-term methods (i.e., sterilization, IUD). This practice is viewed as a way to compensate for low salaries by motivating public-sector staff to provide additional services. It is open to abuse, however, if providers try to steer clients toward those contraceptives for which incentive payments are received. A policy higher in the policy hierarchy for addressing the problem of low salaries in the public sector is to pay higher salaries (reducing the number of employees, if necessary).
42 USAID policy, for example, has long been that "No AID funds can be used to pay potential acceptors of sterilization to induce their acceptance of voluntary sterilization" (quoted in Ross and Isaacs 1988) .
43 Unmet need is a concept developed by demographers (and still being refined by them) that is broadly defined as the number of women who want to limit or space births but who are not currently using contraceptives (Westoff 1997) . Although demographers sometimes refer to it as "unmet demand" or "potential demand" for contraceptives, it entails a definition of "demand" different from that used in standard economics and policy analysis (i.e., willingness to purchase a given quantity and quality of a good or service at a given price).
44 All of these efficiency advantages of decentralization, however, are also generally assured if services are provided by a competitive private sector.
45 It is not clear, however, that democratically elected officials necessarily are appropriately responsive to local preferences. Median voter models, for example, imply that elected officials are responsive to the preferences of median voters, but such responsiveness may ignore the preferences of minorities-and ignoring the preferences of minorities may be viewed as socially inappropriate.
46 For example, where services are of a public good nature, the same arguments can be advanced against purely local governmental finance and administration of these activities as opposed to individual financing through user fees. Similarly, where externalities are present, they may not be limited to the population of localities.
47 There is little reason to expect they would succeed, because in competitive (and even monopolistically competitive) markets there is no reason to expect producers to enjoy long-run profits. If activities in high-income markets are profitable (i.e., generate revenue above actual costs), other investors are attracted into the market and the increased supply drives prices down to the point where price is equal to average cost (i.e., zero profit). This has in fact been the experience of many donor-funded cross-subsidizing ventures.
48 If governments do provide these services directly (and most do), they should be made to compete equally with the private sector: that is, the private sector should receive the same level of subsidies received by governmental providers.
49 Of course, some donors may wish to provide continuing subsidies to services they feel have even higher social marginal benefits than are perceived by recipient governments. For example, donors may choose to support family planning out of a desire to reduce global rates of population growth, because of a perception that this will improve the environment. When this is the case, sustainability depends basically on the maintenance of donor will.
50 Most price elasticity estimates for adult ambulatory care in rural Indonesia are in the range 0.0 to -0.4 (Gertler and Molyneaux 1997) . Most village midwives charge 40,000-70,000 rupiah (Satoto et al. 1995) .
51 US$1=2,348 rupiah at the time the project was designed.
52 This is a conservative estimate of the variance because it does not incorporate variation in risk within each group.
53
The expression I*r(I) is called the consumer's income elasticity of the marginal utility of income, i.e., the percentage change in the consumer's marginal utility of income for a one percent change in income. For example, if I * r(I) = -0.4, a one percent increase in the consumer's income is associated with a 0.4 percent decline in the marginal utility of income.
